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Why do Firms Repurchase Stock?
Jordan Voss
ABSTRACT. The tremendous increase in share repurchases warrants an explanation. Why
have firms increasingly turned to repurchases as a payout method? Undervaluation is
commonly touted as the underlying reason behind repurchase decisions. This paper
identifies several possible rationales behind repurchase decisions, in addition to
undervaluation, by examining the relative advantages of share repurchases over dividends
and the managerial incentives associated with share repurchases. The findings indicate
managerial incentives are a key factor behind the decision to repurchase stock.

I. Introduction
In his 1984 letter to shareholders, Warren Buffet said "When companies
with outstanding businesses and comfortable financial positions find their
shares selling far below intrinsic value in the marketplace, no alternative
action can benefit shareholders as surely as repurchases." For decades,
U.S. corporations have overwhelmingly preferred to distribute excess
cash in the form of dividends rather than share repurchases, despite the
preferential tax treatment of capital gains over ordinary income (Grullon
and Michaely 2002). Since the early 1980s, however, share repurchase
activity has grown significantly. In 2004 (net) repurchases for U.S.
industrials were $155 billion while dividends were about $137 billion
(Skinner 2008). This means that in 2004, for the first time in history,
share repurchase programs were more popular than dividends.
Why has there been such a dramatic change in corporate payout
policy over the last 30 years? That is, why are companies increasingly
turning to stock repurchases as a distribution method for excess cash?
Logically, the only reason for a firm to repurchase stock is because it is
undervalued. Empirical evidence, however, finds that undervaluation
alone is not enough to explain a firm's repurchase decision. This paper
identifies several likely reasons corporations repurchase stock by
examining the undervaluation hypothesis, the relation between stock
repurchases and dividends, and managerial incentives. It concludes that
managerial incentives have a significant impact on corporate payout
policy.
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II. Background Information
A. HISTORY AND REGULATION
Nearly all of the research on share repurchases has been conducted
subsequent to the early 1980s. Prior to this period, share repurchase
programs were virtually non-existent. This is because the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, Section 9, prohibited the manipulation of
securities prices (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 1934). In
addition, Section 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act prohibited "any
act or omission resulting in fraud or deceit in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security" (U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission 1934). Corporations were reluctant to repurchase stock on
the open market due to the potential risk of violating the prohibited
manipulation provisions of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.
Share repurchase programs have never been illegal in the United States,
but there is reason to believe that regulators have been concerned with the
impact these programs might have on stock prices. The in 1967 a Senate
Committee wrote:
Corporate repurchases of their own securities may serve a
number of legitimate purposes. For example, they may result
from a desire to reduce outstanding capital stock following the
cash sale of operating divisions or subsidiaries, or to have shares
available for options, acquisitions, employee or stock purchase
plans, and the like, without increasing the total number of shares
outstanding. Repurchase programs, however, may also be utilized
by management to preserve or strengthen their control by
counteracting tender offers or other attempted takeovers, or may
be made in order to increase the market price of the company's
shares. Whatever the motive behind the repurchase program, if
the repurchases are substantial they will have a significant impact
on the market. (Senate Report No. 550, 90th Congress; 1967).
According to Grullon and Michaely (2002), the SEC has, for decades,
occasionally charged companies with illegally manipulating their stock
prices during share repurchase programs. Until 1982 there were no
specific rules that directly regulated share repurchase activity in the
United States. Grullon et al. (2002) argue that "This situation exposed
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repurchasing firms to the risk of triggering a SEC investigation and being
charged with illegal market manipulation. Since the direct and indirect
costs of a regulatory inquiry can be very large, it seems that firms were
indeed deterred from repurchasing shares."
Between 1967 and 1980 the SEC proposed several rules in an effort
to direct corporations on how to implement share repurchase programs
without raising suspicions of manipulative behavior (Grullon et al. 2002).
Finally, after nearly fifteen years of proposals, the SEC approved Rule
10b-18, which "provides a voluntary 'safe harbor' from liability for
manipulation under Sections 9a-2 and 10b of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, and Rule 10b-5 under the Securities Exchange Act, when an
issuer or its affiliated purchaser bids for or purchases shares of the issuer's
common stock" (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 1934). If
firms were reluctant to repurchase shares because of the potential risk of
being charged with illegal market manipulation by the SEC, then share
repurchase activity should have increased significantly after the adoption
of Rule 10b-18 in 1982 (Grullon et al. 2002).
B. REPURCHASE METHODS
One of the main regulatory concerns about repurchases is the potential for
shareholders to be treated unequally, as some investors will sell their
shares back to the firm and others will not. In order to deal with this
problem, the SEC requires that companies publicly announce, prior to any
repurchase, that they have received authorizations from the Board of
Directors to buy back their own shares. There are essentially five ways
that a corporation can repurchase its own shares: (1) Fixed price tender
offer, (2) Dutch auction tender offer, (3) Repurchase in the open market,
(4) Negotiated repurchase from private investors, and (5) Repurchase
involving derivatives (Vermaelen 2005). The most common way to
repurchase stock is through an open market share repurchase program;
therefore, the focus of the paper will only be on shares repurchased in the
open market.
In contrast to tender offers (where the company is obligated by the
SEC to repurchase its, publicly announced, targeted number of shares),
open market share repurchase programs are not firm commitments
(Vermaelen 2005). Similar to a traditional option contract, in an open
market share repurchase program the company has an option to
repurchase stock, but not an obligation. Consequently, it is common to
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see repurchase programs completed several years after the announcement
of the repurchase authorization (Vermaelen 2005). While open market
repurchase programs are not firm commitments, Stephens and Weisbach
(1998) show that the average completion rate in the U.S. is between 74
and 82 percent. Using a more precise method to measure repurchase
activity, Kahle, Dyl and Banyi (2005) show a completion rate of 90% in
their sample of Fortune 500 firms. Although open market repurchase
authorizations are not always followed by actual repurchases, that does
not mean that managers are trying to manipulate their stock price or are
doing something unethical. In a study of Canadian companies, Ikenberry,
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (2000) show that firms tend to repurchase
fewer shares if the stock price rises significantly in the year following the
repurchase. This evidence is consistent with the belief that managers try
to take advantage of undervalued stock prices, but refrain from
repurchasing stock if the market becomes efficient, or inefficient but in
the opposite direction. Alternatively, it could mean that the firm
discovered new growth opportunities, which made stock repurchases
relatively unattractive (Vermaelen, 2005). In either case, failure by a
company to complete its open market repurchase authorization should not
necessarily be viewed negatively. Rather, it can be seen as a positive that
management wants to repurchase shares only when the shares are at
undervalued prices or when the company has no alternative uses for its
excess cash.

III. The Undervaluation Hypothesis and Signaling
Many different theories have been suggested as to why companies
purchase their shares in the open market. Perhaps the most
straightforward way to address this question is to poll executives of
corporations and document their answers. In 2005, Brav, Graham,
Harvey, and Michaely surveyed 384 financial executives and conducted
in-depth interviews with an additional 23 to determine the factors that
drive dividend and share repurchase decisions. The summary results from
their survey will be discussed throughout the paper.
The most fundamental explanation as to why companies repurchase
their stock is that the company believes their shares are undervalued, and
can therefore create shareholder value by purchasing their own shares at
a discount to intrinsic value. On the surface this first theory is the only
logical explanation for a company to repurchase its stock. After all, the
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goal of financial management is to maximize shareholder value, and if
shares are repurchased at anything other than an undervalued price,
shareholder value would be destroyed. Many other theories, however,
have been offered by academics that attempt to explain a company's
decision to repurchase its stock, regardless of whether or not the shares
are undervalued.
The undervaluation hypothesis is similar to the signaling hypothesis.
When management repurchases stock solely on the basis of
undervaluation, management is, in effect, sending a signal to the market
that their future prospects (projected cash flows) are not accurately
reflected in the price of the stock. Therefore, the undervaluation
hypothesis assumes that markets are strong-form inefficient because
company insiders are able to take advantage of the informational
asymmetry between themselves and investors. In the survey of Chief
Financial Officers (CFOs) the most important motivation behind
repurchasing stock is to "take advantage of an undervalued stock price"
(Brav, et al. 2005). In the same survey, however, few CFOs indicated that
payout policy decisions were made for the purpose of conveying
information to shareholders or the market (Brav, et al. 2005). This likely
implies that the Undervaluation Hypothesis is an important factor in
determining payout policy while the signal resulting from the payout
policy decision is an important factor in determining why stock prices
tend to increase after certain payout methods.
Warren Buffett, Chairman and CEO of Berkshire Hathaway and
arguably the greatest investor of all time, said the following about stock
repurchases in his 1984 and 2011 letters to shareholders:
…We like making money for continuing shareholders, and there
is no surer way to do that than by buying an asset - our own stock
- that we know to be worth at least x for less than that - for .9x,
.8x or even lower. (As one of our directors says, it's like shooting
fish in a barrel, after the barrel has been drained and the fish have
quit flopping) (2011).
When companies purchase their own stock, they often find it easy
to get $2 of present value for $1. Corporate acquisition programs
almost never do as well and, in a discouragingly large number of
cases, fail to get anything close to $1 of value for each $1
expended (1984).
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It seems many Chief Financial Officers surveyed agree with Buffett's
logic. Most CFOs said that they accelerate (or initiate) share repurchases
when their company's stock is low by recent historical standards (Brav,
et al. 2005). The most popular response for all repurchase questions on
the entire survey is that firms repurchase when their stock is a good value,
relative to its true value: 86% of all firms agree or strongly agree with this
belief (Brav, et al. 2005).
Other than simply relying on survey evidence, it might be useful to
look at empirical data to determine whether the Undervaluation
Hypothesis is true. If the Undervaluation Hypothesis is correct,
companies that repurchase their stock would likely do so when their stock
is trading at a low price. Indeed, empirical evidence seems to indicate
that firms repurchase stock when they are potentially undervalued, as
evidenced by the firm's market-to-book ratio (Dittmar, 2000). Similarly,
Stephens and Weisbach (1998) show that firms repurchase stock after a
period of negative stock performance. Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1994) also show that firms with low market-to-book ratios earn abnormal
returns in subsequent periods. In addition, Fenn and Liang (2001) find
that repurchases are positively related to net operating cash flow and
negatively related to market-to-book ratios.
In concluding that the Undervaluation Hypothesis is correct, the
academic research is also implicitly concluding that there is an
information asymmetry between a firm's executives and its investors.
That is, the firm knows more about the true value of its stock than outside
investors and can therefore capitalize on this informational advantage by
repurchasing its stock at a price below its true value.
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While this seems logical, consider the following chart from The Wall
Street Journal which might show a slightly different story. A closer
examination shows that stock repurchases by U.S. companies hit their
highest level in the third quarter of 2007, precisely the time that the Great
Recession in the U.S. began. The Standard and Poor's 500 Index fell from
1526.75 in September 2007 to 735.09 in February 2009, representing a
decline of 51.9%. Perhaps company insiders do not always possess an
informational advantage over outside investors.

IV. The Difference Between Repurchasing Stock and
Paying Dividends
To explain the reasoning behind repurchasing stock instead of paying
cash dividends to shareholders, a few assumptions need to be made. First,
a company is not repurchasing its shares because they are undervalued.
The shares could be undervalued, but this is not the motivation for the
repurchase. Second, we assume that the company has excess cash and not
enough uses for its cash. It is often argued that companies that repurchase
stock have no other profitable investment opportunities or uses for its
cash. This argument, however, is not as prevalent in the case of a
dividend increase or initiation. In this section it must be assumed that in
either the case of a dividend increase or in the case of a repurchase
authorization, the company has excess cash on hand and not enough
investment opportunities or uses for its cash.
In 1958, Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller argued that firm value
is driven by operating and investment decisions, rather than financing or
payout decisions. This would imply that firm value is unaffected by the
choice between repurchases and dividends and, therefore, any amount of
time spent discussing the topic is wasted. Modigliani and Miller,
however, made several assumptions in their research. First, the
assumption of perfect capital markets assumed no buyer or seller of
securities is large enough for his actions to have an appreciable impact on
the price; all traders have equal and costless access to information about
the securities; no brokerage fees, transfer taxes, or other transaction costs
are incurred when securities are bought or sold, and there are no tax
differentials either between distributed and undistributed profits or
between dividends and capital gains. Second, Modigliani and Miller
assumed that all investors exhibit rational behavior. Finally, the
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assumption of perfect certainty implies that every investor has complete
assurance as to the future investment program and future profits of every
corporation (Modigliani and Miller, 1961). In the real world, however,
capital markets are not perfect, investors are not rational, and perfect
certainty is nonexistent.
The survey by Brav et al. (2005) sheds some light on the actual views
of CFOs concerning the relative importance executives place on payout
policy. The survey evidence indicates that dividend choices are made
simultaneously with (or even a bit sooner than) investment decisions but
that repurchase decisions are made later (Brav, et al. 2005). On a scale
from -2 (strongly disagree) to +2 (strongly agree), the average rating is
-0.3 that investment decisions are made before dividend decisions but the
rating is +1.0 that investment decisions are made before repurchases.
Evidence from interviews indicates that this difference is not just a
question of timing, but of priorities. Interviewed managers say that they
would pass up some positive net present value (NPV) investment projects
before cutting dividends (Brav, et al. 2005). These responses imply that
dividends are not residual cash flows (i.e. left over after investment
decisions have already been made), as the Modigliani and Miller theorem
suggests they should be. Repurchases, meanwhile, are treated as residual
cash flows as implied by Modigliani and Miller (Brav, et al. 2005).
A. THE PREFERENTIAL TAX HYPOTHESIS
In many countries, the personal income tax rate on capital gains is lower
than the tax rate on dividends. This was true in the United States until the
Jobs and Growth Tax Reconciliation Act was passed in 2003. The
preferential tax hypothesis states that stock repurchases are preferred over
dividends because the personal tax rate on capital gains is lower. Here is
the logic: When a firm has excess cash and decides to repurchase stock,
there are no taxes paid by shareholders. Assuming zero dividends,
investors will only experience gains in the form of price appreciation, or
capital gains. Shareholders do not pay taxes on these gains until they
realize the gains by selling their stock. Thus, when firms repurchase
stock, shareholders have the freedom to make their own decision when to
pay taxes on their gains. When a firm pays a dividend, shareholders do
not have any control over the timing of their tax payments.
Lie and Lie (2000) empirically examine whether managers consider
the tax situation of the firm's investors when deciding the distribution
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method by using samples of open market repurchase programs and regular
dividends. Their study finds that "firms are more likely to choose open
market repurchase programs over regular dividend increases if the firms'
shareholders have low tax rates on capital gains relative to tax rates on
dividends" (2000). Lie and Lie also discovered another interesting result:
Firms are more likely to choose regular dividends rather than share
repurchases if the firm's stock has recently experienced a large price
appreciation (2000). In this event, investors would pay higher capital
gains taxes if they sold their shares in the open market, rather than if they
received the cash distribution in the form of a regular dividend increase.
The empirical results by Lie and Lie suggest that the choice between
dividends and stock repurchases is in fact affected by the tax rate of the
firm's shareholders.
While Lie and Lie show that personal taxes paid by a firm's
shareholders do affect the firm's payout decision, the survey of CFOs
indicates that taxes were of second-order importance to a firm's managers
(Brav, et al. 2005). When the survey was administered dividends were
taxed at rates as high as 40% for retail investors, while the maximum
long-term capital gains tax rate was 20% (Brav, et al. 2005). According
to the survey, only 21.1% of dividend-paying firms cited the tax
disadvantage as an important factor affecting dividend decisions (Brav,
et al. 2005). Likewise, only 29.1% of repurchasing firms cited personal
taxes as an important factor affecting the number of shares repurchased
(Brav, et al. 2005). Overall, in contrast to the empirical results from Lie
and Lie, executives indicate that differential taxes were a consideration,
but not a primary concern, in payout policy decisions.
B. THE TYPE OF SHAREHOLDERS
A related issue is whether the sensitivity of the choice between stock
repurchases and dividend increases is affected by the type of a firm's
shareholders. Generally, there are two types of investors, institutional
and non-institutional. Institutional investors, as the name implies, are
institutions. These institutions are able to pool together large sums of
capital for the purpose of investment. Some of the more familiar
institutional investors include commercial banks, insurance companies,
pension funds, hedge funds, and mutual funds. Non-institutional
investors are, by definition, any investors that are not institutions.
Non-institutional investors are individuals or small organizations who

64

Major Themes in Economics, Spring 2012

manage their own money. The type-of-shareholders hypothesis examines
whether the method of distribution is affected by whether the majority of
a firms shareholders are institutional investors or Non-institutional
investors.
Michael Jensen (1986) suggests that many managerial decisions, such
as how to distribute excess capital to shareholders, are affected by a
conflict of interest between managers and shareholders. This conflict of
interest is known as Agency Theory, or more commonly, the
Principal-Agent Problem. The Principal-Agent Problem suggests that a
firm's managers (the agents) may choose the course of action that
maximizes their own utility rather than the one that maximizes their
shareholders' (the principals) wealth. According to Lie and Lie (2000),
however, in choosing the method of disbursement, the interests of
managers and shareholders appear to be reasonably well aligned.
Therefore, "the only reasons why managers may ignore the tax
consequences of the disbursement are that they are uninformed about the
tax statuses of the shareholders or that they prefer procedures that are the
most familiar to them or require the least work to implement" (2000).
Institutional investors would theoretically be more capable and willing
than non-institutional investors to inform managers about the tax
implications of the two distribution alternatives.
Furthermore,
institutional investors would also be more likely to force managers to
choose the alternative that maximizes the after-tax value of the
disbursement. Thus, it would be expected that firms with a large fraction
of institutional investors would be more sensitive to the shareholders' tax
positions. Empirical evidence provided by Lie and Lie (2000) suggests
that this is the case. In particular, evidence for the preferential tax
hypothesis is stronger for firms with high institutional holdings than for
firms with low institutional holdings.
C. THE CASH FLOW PERMANENCE HYPOTHESIS
The cash flow permanence hypothesis suggests that a firm's decision to
distribute excess cash flows in the form of stock repurchases or dividends
is based, in part, on the permanence of the excess cash flows.
Theoretically, dividend increases would be associated with permanent
excess cash flows while share repurchases would be associated with more
temporary excess cash flows. When a firm initiates or increases a
dividend, it is generally viewed as a positive signal to the market. The
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positive signal occurs because the firm knows that its stock price will be
severely punished if it decreases or suspends the dividend at any time in
the future. Ghosh and Woolridge (1998) show that stock prices decline,
on average, by about 6% on the three days surrounding the announcement
of a dividend cut. Therefore, if the firm has any doubt that it will not be
able to sustain the dividend in the future, it is not likely to initiate or
increase a dividend. Instead, the firm is more likely to repurchase stock
as a means to distribute its excess cash as the announcement of a share
repurchase plan requires no future commitment.
In examining the cash flow permanence hypothesis, Guay and
Harford (2000) conducted two tests. First, they tested whether dividends
are associated with permanent cash flow shocks and repurchases
associated with transient cash flow shocks. Second, under the hypothesis
that a firm's choice of cash distribution is driven by its expected cash flow
permanence, announcements of dividend increases and stock repurchases
will convey different information to investors. When stock prices do not
fully anticipate the permanence of the cash flow shock, the market uses
the method of distribution (stock repurchase vs. dividend increase) to
update its estimate of that permanence. A dividend increase will likely
convey more favorable information about the permanence of the excess
cash flows than a stock repurchase. The second test by Guay and
Harford, therefore, is a prediction about the information conveyed by the
method used to make the distribution.
Guay and Harford find, on average that "cash-flow shocks preceding
substantial dividend increases are significantly more permanent than
cash-flow shocks preceding repurchases" (2000). As part of their
analysis, Guay and Harford used control firms that did not change their
cash distributions.
Compared with these control firms,
dividend-increasing firms exhibited significantly more permanent cash
flow shocks (2000). In contrast, repurchasing firms' cash flow shocks are
no more permanent than those of non-distributing firms (2000). Further,
Guay and Harford find that, on average "the market correctly assesses that
the cash flows of firms that subsequently increase their dividends are
more permanent than those of control firms that do not increase their
payout" (2000).
This is evidenced by a significantly higher
market-adjusted stock return over the two-year period preceding dividend
increases. In contrast, the market-adjusted returns of firms that
subsequently initiate repurchases are no different from the
market-adjusted returns of control firms (2000).
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If the cash flow permanence hypothesis is in fact true, there is another
possible method for distributing transient excess cash flows to
shareholders. In this event, a firm could issue a one-time special dividend
to shareholders rather than repurchase its stock. It would be interesting
to analyze the differences between special dividends and share
repurchases; however, little or no research has been conducted on this
specific topic.

V. Other Possible Reasons for Share Repurchases
A. INCREASE EARNINGS PER SHARE HYPOTHESIS
Both the financial press and reports from sell-side research analysts
suggest that stock repurchases are often motivated by a desire to increase
earnings per share (EPS). Corporate CFOs apparently agree. The survey
of CFOs by Brav, et al. (2005) found that repurchases in an attempt to
increase EPS is very important. Their results indicating that firms
repurchase their stock in order to increase EPS are surprising because,
theoretically, this practice does not change the value of a firm. It simply
decreases the denominator in the EPS equation and leaves the important
factor, net income, unchanged. Wouldn't analysts and investors be able
to identify this practice and adjust for the change in EPS accordingly?
Bens, Nagar, Skinner, and Wong (2003) investigate whether a firm's
repurchase decisions are affected by their incentives to manage diluted
earnings per share. Bens et al. (2003) focus their research on two main
predictions: First, they investigate whether executives increase the
amount of their firm's repurchases to offset the dilutive effect of securities
such as employee stock options (ESOs) that would otherwise reduce
diluted EPS. Second, they investigate whether executives increase their
firm's stock repurchases when they become aware that their earnings are
falling short of the level required to meet EPS growth targets. They find
that stock repurchases increase in years when options-related EPS dilution
increases and when annual earnings are below the level required to
sustain past EPS growth rates (Bens, et al. 2003). Because of their dual
focus, however, their sample of firms is limited to firms that face
options-related EPS dilution. We are only concerned with the desire to
increase EPS, not the desire to increase EPS to offset dilution of ESOs as
a motivation for stock repurchases; therefore, the sample selection could
skew the results.
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Hribar, Jenkins, and Johnson (2006) extend the findings by Bens et
al. in several ways. First, Hribar et al. use a sample of firms that is not
limited to firms that face options-related EPS dilution. This allows for an
investigation into a broader set of questions about the use of stock
repurchases to manage EPS. Second, they examine the distribution of
accretive (i.e., EPS increasing) stock repurchases conditional on analysts'
EPS forecast errors. This shifts the benchmark comparison from
historical EPS to analysts' EPS forecasts. Hribar et al. (2006) find a
higher than expected proportion of accretive stock repurchases among
firms with small, negative "pre-repurchase" earnings surprises. This
result is consistent with the belief that firms use repurchases to
compensate for earnings shortfalls, or, more specifically, firms use
repurchases to meet analysts' EPS estimates when they would not have
otherwise met those estimates. Likewise, they find a lower-than-expected
proportion of EPS-decreasing repurchases among firms with small
positive pre-repurchase earnings surprises (Hribar et al. 2006). This
result implies that firms avoid stock repurchases that would induce an
earnings shortfall.
Perhaps the most surprising result found by Hribar et al. (2006) is that
using a repurchase to meet or beat analysts' EPS forecasts helps firms
avoid a potentially large negative stock price response associated with
missing analysts' forecasts. This finding indicates that the market does
not properly "punish" the stock of a firm taht only met or beat analysts'
EPS forecasts because the firm repurchased its stock. Furthermore, the
results imply that investors simply look at EPS reported by the firm, not
other figures such as net income, in making investment decisions. In
order to illustrate this finding, consider the following simple example of
two firms, A and B:

Net Income

Firm A
$5,000,000

Firm B
$5,000,000

Beg. Shares Outstanding
Shares Repurchased
End. Shares Outstanding

1,000,000
100,000
900,000

1,000,000
0
1,000,000

EPS
Analysts’ EPS Estimate
Earnings Beat (Miss)

$5.56
$5.50
$0.06

$5.00
$5.50
($0.50)
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Both firms have 100,000 shares outstanding, report net income of
$5,000,000, and have analysts' EPS estimates of $5.50 per share. During
the year, Firm A, recognizing that it will not meet analysts' EPS estimates,
decides to repurchase 100,000 shares of stock. Firm B, meanwhile,
decides not to repurchase any shares. At the end of the year, with
900,000 shares outstanding, Firm A reports EPS of $5.56, beating
analysts' expectations by $0.06. The small EPS beat results in little or no
change of Firm A's stock price after the announcement. Firm B, however,
with 1,000,000 shares outstanding reports EPS of $5.00, missing analysts'
expectations by $0.50. The sizeable EPS miss results in a large decline
in the price of Firm B's stock.
The empirical results from Hribaret al. (2006) and the above example
illustrate the ignorance of investors when firms repurchase their stock in
order to meet or beat analysts' EPS estimates. If investors were rational,
they would make adjustments to offset the effect of the repurchase by
Firm A when comparing its reported EPS to the EPS forecasted by
analysts. By not making these simple adjustments for repurchases,
however, investors are effectively encouraging firms to continue the
practice of repurchasing shares solely for the purpose of increasing EPS.
In addition, a firm's managers have an incentive to continue this behavior.
Missing EPS estimates generally results in a declining stock price, and
executives of companies with lackluster stock performance commonly
find themselves in search of new employment.
B. REPURCHASES AND STOCK OPTIONS
The following two possible explanations for a firm's decision to
repurchase stock appear very similar on the surface, but the motivations
behind each of them are actually quite different. The first explanation
assumes that firms use stock options to compensate their employees. This
practice increases the number of shares outstanding, so the firm
repurchases shares to maintain a relatively stable total share count. The
management stock incentives hypothesis looks at the choice between
repurchases and dividends as it relates to the incentives of a firm's
executives. This explanation asserts that managers who are compensated
with stock options will favor repurchases over dividends because
dividends reduce the value of their stock options. Thus, the first
explanation assumes managers repurchase shares to offset the dilution of
employee stock options, while the second explanation assumes managers
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repurchase shares to maximize their own personal wealth.
1. Employee Compensation and Offsetting Dilution of Employee Stock
Option Programs
Firms grant stock options to their employees for a number of reasons.
First, employee stock options increase the flexibility of a firm's cost
structure. For example, many small start-up companies lack access to
capital, so they use stock options to compensate employees in order to
conserve precious cash. Second, employee stock options better align the
incentives of a firm's employees with its owners, or shareholders. Finally,
employee stock options enhance the incentives for productive behavior
throughout the entire firm. For all of these reasons, granting stock
options to employees has become increasingly common. The decision to
repurchase stock, however, should stand on its own merit and not depend
on how the shares were issued. Just because stock has been issued to
satisfy options does not mean that stock should be repurchased at a price
above true value. Likewise, a stock that sells well below its true value
should be repurchased whether or not stock has previously been issued
because of outstanding options. In practice, companies often publicly
state they are going to repurchase shares with the intent of offsetting
dilution from employee stock options. For example, Apple Inc. recently
announced a $10 billion share repurchase program. The company's press
release stated that, "The repurchase program is expected to be executed
over three years, with the primary objective of neutralizing the impact of
dilution from future employee equity grants and employee stock purchase
programs" (Apple Inc. press release).
The survey of financial executives by Brav et al. (2005) finds that
many companies tie the magnitude of their repurchases, at least in part,
to the amount necessary to eliminate earnings dilution by stock option
compensation or employee stock plans. Two-thirds of survey respondents
report that offsetting dilution is an important or very important factor
affecting their repurchase decisions (2005). In contrast, there is virtually
no support for the idea that companies repurchase shares instead of
issuing dividends because employee stock options are not
dividend-protected. Only 10.6% of survey respondents reported this was
true (2005). It should be noted, however, that survey evidence clearly has
limitations. Despite the assurances of anonymity, it is likely that few
financial executives would admit to repurchasing stock instead of paying
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dividends in order to maximize their own personal wealth. When put into
perspective, the 10.6% of respondents who admit to this practice might
actually be quite large and significant.
Weisbenner (2000) examined share repurchases in 1995 and found
that total options outstanding, rather than executive options outstanding
(which will be covered in the next section), are correlated with repurchase
activity. While conducting additional tests, Weisbenner found that both
total and executive options are helpful in explaining total payouts.
Furthermore, Weisbenner discovered another very interesting result.
Weisbenner found that repurchases are timed to offset the accounting
effects of dilution in earnings per share, and are not timed to negate the
real dilution that occurs upon the exercise of the stock options. This
result is consistent with the theory that firms repurchase stock in order to
increase earnings per share that was proposed in the previous section.
Klassen and Sivakumar (2001) analyzed repurchase activity and
employee and executive option activity for nonfinancial firms for the
period 1995-1999. They found that both total options outstanding and
executive options outstanding have a positive effect on repurchase
behavior (2001). In addition, they found that, in general, the value of the
firm was declining in the period preceding the announcement and the
announcement had a significant positive effect on the market price of the
firm's stock (2001). Klassen and Sivakumar argue that options impose a
cost on shareholders by diluting a firm's existing equity because options
are not subtracted from income and, therefore, inflate reported profits. If
this is true, then investors should recognize this and the degree of
abnormal returns should be lower for firms with a large amount of options
outstanding. Indeed, Klassen and Sivakumar, in a regression of abnormal
returns, find that markets react to stock repurchases less enthusiastically
when firms grant options. Investors seem to recognize that employee
stock option programs represent a real cost to the firm in the form of
share repurchases, likely due to the resultant transfer of wealth from
shareholders to employees.
2. Management Stock Incentives Hypothesis
The management stock incentives hypothesis was first suggested by
Lambert, Lanen, and Larcker in 1989. Lambert et al. (1989) find that
dividends decrease following the initial adoption of a stock option plan
for senior-level executives. Moreover, they find evidence that the most
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noticeable decreases in dividends occur for firms where a dividend
reduction is expected to lead to the greatest increase in the value of a
stock option. When a firm decides to pay a cash dividend, the price of the
stock will approximately decline by the amount of the dividend on the
ex-dividend date (the first day a stock trades without a dividend). Given
that the value of a call option depends on the underlying stock price, the
value of a call option on a stock that pays a dividend would be less than
the value of a call option on a stock without a dividend, all else equal.
Specifically, the value of a call option with a dividend is approximately
equal to the value of a call option without a dividend less the present
value of all future dividends times the delta (price sensitivity of the option
to the underlying stock price) of the call option. This implies that
executives who own a large number of stock options would have an
incentive to repurchase stock instead of paying dividends as a means of
distributing excess cash to shareholders. To illustrate the impact of
dividends on option values, consider the following two examples.
Example 1: Ignoring signaling and other effects, if a firm worth
$1,000 has 100 shares outstanding (a value of $10 per share) and pays a
total of $100 in dividends, each share will be worth $9 after the dividend
distribution. If the $100 is instead used to repurchase ten shares of stock,
then the firm's remaining 90 shares will each be worth $10, just as they
were before the repurchase. The value of a call option is greater at a
stock price of $10 (by repurchasing ten shares) than at a stock price of $9
(by paying a 10% dividend).
Example 2: Suppose a firm worth $1,000 has 100 shares outstanding
and pays a $50 dividend (dividend yield = 5%). The firm decides to
permanently reduce the dividend from $50 to $25 (dividend yield =
2.5%). Over the life of a ten-year option (management stock options are
typically issued with ten years to expiration), the decision to decrease the
dividend yield from 5% to 2.5% results in lower dividends equal to 25%
of the value of the firm (ten years times 2.5% per year). Assuming that
the average delta of the option is 50%, the decision to permanently reduce
the dividend yield by 2.5% will result in an increase in the option value
equal to 12.5% of the share price. Thus, the management wealth effect
that results from this alteration in dividend policy is substantial.
Fenn and Liang (2001) find a strong negative relationship between
dividend yields and the amount of management stock options. Their
results imply that a one standard deviation change in the management
stock option variable (measured by stock options held by executive
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officers as a percentage of total shares outstanding) reduces dividend
yields by a statistically and economically significant 38 basis points
(2001). Fenn and Liang (2001) also find a significant positive
relationship between repurchases and management stock options. Their
results suggest that management stock options could help to explain the
rise in repurchases at the expense of dividends. In addition, Fenn and
Liang (2001) find that the negative relationship between management
stock options and dividends is obtained only if options are not
dividend-protected. It is actually very rare, however, for stock options to
be dividend-protected. Murphy (1998) finds that out of 618 large
corporations that granted stock options to their CEOs in 1992, only seven
had plans that included dividend protection. Weisbenner (1998) reports
that in his sample of 799 companies that granted stock options in 1994,
only two offered dividend protection.
Similarly, Jolls (1998) finds that repurchases are significantly more
likely when executives have many stock options than when they have few.
Jolls takes her analysis one step further and examines not only the
relationship between executive stock options and repurchases, but also the
relationship between total employee stock options and repurchases. A
strong positive relationship between total employee stock options and
repurchases would likely indicate that management repurchases shares in
order to offset the dilution of options, not necessarily to enhance their
own personal wealth by propping up option values. Jolls (1998),
however, finds that only executive options, not total employee options,
are significant in explaining repurchase behavior. These findings suggest
that the rise of executive stock options since the late 1970s may have
played a significant role in the increase in share repurchase activity in that
time (Jolls, 1998).

VI. Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to explain why companies repurchase their
stock. According to basic logic, undervaluation should be the only
motivation for a repurchase. Yet, both survey evidence and empirical
research illustrate a much different story. Despite failing to identify a
single determinant, the paper identifies and examines several possible
motives behind a company's repurchase decision by examining the
undervaluation hypothesis, the relation between stock repurchases and
dividends, and managerial incentives. Undervaluation is consistently
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touted as the underlying reason for a repurchase; however, evidence of
undervaluation is somewhat inconclusive with regard to repurchases.
Furthermore, the relative advantages of share repurchases over dividends
(examined in the tax preference hypothesis, the type of shareholders
hypothesis, and the financial flexibility hypothesis) appear to have some,
however limited, merit in explaining repurchases. Evidence originating
from the topic of managerial incentives, specifically the increase earnings
per share hypothesis and the managerial stock incentives hypothesis,
seems to explain best the popularity of repurchases.
Going forward, future research might include a regression analysis
that would empirically analyze the key factors behind repurchase
decisions. Several variables should be included in this regression model.
First, a variable, such as a market-to-book ratio or a price-to-earnings
multiple, should be used to measure whether the stock was undervalued
at the time of repurchase. Second, a variable should be included to
determine whether the stock was repurchased in order to meet or beat
earnings per share estimates. Third, a variable measuring the amount of
total employee stock options outstanding should be included to identify
whether repurchases were used to counter the effect of options dilution.
Finally, a variable measuring the amount of executive stock options
outstanding should be included to identify whether repurchases were used
to maximize the wealth of executives, as concluded in this paper.
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